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Daniel T. Devereux 
University of Virginia
Ethical Method in Aristotle: 
Setting Out the Phainomena
I
Recent work on Aristotle's method in ethics has enabled us more than ever 
to appreciate the power and sophistication of his thinking in this area· We 
now have a much firmer basis for believing that we may have important lessons 
to learn from Aristotle about the nature and limits of moral theory. However, 
it is not yet clear what those important lessons are for there is fundamental 
disagreement about the nature of Aristotle's method· Some claim that the 
moral theory of the Ethics rests on principles that are not susceptible to any 
form of rational justification; others claim that, although moral first prin­
ciples cannot be scientifically demonstrated, they can be justified through 
dialectical arguments - arguments based on opinions that are widely shared or 
held by figures who can speak with some authority about the matters in ques­
tion. still another view has it that Aristotle bases his moral theory on cer­
tain principles about human nature drawn from his psychology and metaphysics.
The diversity of these views reflects, I believe, the complexity of the 
phenomena we have to account for in a study of Aristotle's method in ethics. 
There are passages that provide some support for each of the views I have 
mentioned, and it is therefore hard to see how the divergent strands of his 
thought can be made coherent, whether or not we can hope for a coherent 
picture in the end, the first task, as Aristotle says, is to set out the 
phenomena and discuss the difficulties. The phenomena I have in mind are not 
only remarks about ethical method but passages in which we can clearly see 
methodological principles being applied. I hope to show that more work is 
needed on this first stage of a study of Aristotle's ethical method; what we 
need and do not yet have is a careful and complete setting out of the 
phenomena.1
Several of the’ key passages on method in the ethical treatises are 
thought to be related to Aristotle's theory of dialectic. For instance, the 
well known passage that serves as a preface to the discussion of acrasia in 
NE VII has been described as a convenient summary of what dialectic meant for 
Aristotle. In the first part of my discussion I will give a brief account of 
dialectic as it is portrayed in the Topics, and will try to show that it is 
quite different from the "method of endoxa" described in NE VII. I will then 
turn to the discussion of happiness in NE I, and argue that some of the proce­
dures used by Aristotle fit the method of endoxa, but some do not. Finally, I 
will try to determine the exact role of endoxa in the discussion of happiness 
in NE I, and make a foray into the question, what sort of rational justifica­
tion, if any, does Aristotle offer for his ethical first principles?
II
Dialectic, as Aristotle understands it in the Topics, is a particular
2kind of rule-governed discussion.^ The kinds of questions appropriately ad­
dressed in a dialectical discussion are those over which people are divided in 
their views - i.e. matters of controversy and doubt.3 such discussions 
apparently take place in public and are always between two individuals, a 
questioner and an answerer. The answerer either chooses or is assigned a 
“thesis" to defend. The aim of the questioner is to refute the thesis by 
establishing.its contradictory.4 The questioner must formulate his questions 
so that they admit of a simple yes or no answer. Aristotle sets out rules and 
guidelines for both questioner and answerer.® some of the rules are of the 
nature of requirements that must be met if the discussion is to qualify as 
dialectical; others are designed to tell one how to achieve success as a 
dialectician, success is not determined by whether one succeeds, as an 
answerer, in defending a thesis, or, as a questioner, in refuting the 
opponent’s thesis; one might lose the debate but still perform better than 
one's adversary if, for example, you had to defend a thesis that was 
relatively easy to refute but you made it quite difficult for your opponent.®
The currency of dialectical discussion is opinion rather than truth.? The 
premises of dialectical arguments are endoxa-“reputable opinions“, following 
the felicitous translation of Jonathan Barnes.® Reputable opinions can be 
ranked in terms of their degree of reputability; some endoxa are more endoxon 
than others.® In formulating his arguments, the dialectician will make the 
best use of the available resources; in other words, his arguments will be 
based on the most reputable opinions available.(The answerer must be care­
ful to concede only premises that have a fairly high degree of reputability 
relative to the thesis he is defending. )·*■·*· The dialectician will sometimes 
need to base his argument on premises which he recognizes to be false; some­
times he will argue for false conclusions.^ This is in no way incompatible 
with dialectic since what is important in dialectical arguments is not whether 
the premises are true but whether they are reputable opinions.
For if it depends on false but reputable premises, the 
argument is dialectical (logikos); if on true but not 
reputable premises, it is a bad argument [i.e., from the 
point of view of dialectic]. (Top. VIII 12, 162b 27-28.)
Aristotle contrasts dialectical discussions with sophistical discussions, 
on the one hand, and discussions for the sake of teaching and learning on the 
other.I® Participants in a sophistical discussion rely on premises which only 
appear to be endoxa and their arguments are often apparent but not true syllo­
gisms.^ sophistical discussions are purely competitive; contestants will use 
virtually any means to achieve their end of appearing to defeat the opponent, 
or at least of not suffering defeat.·*·® At the other end of the spectrum are 
discussions between teacher and learner - "didactic" discussions. Here the 
commitment to truth is absolute: the learner, who plays the part of answerer 
in the discussion, must always say what he thinks is true, and the teacher qua 
teacher must always show what is true.
Aristotle says that dialectical discussions are undertaken for the sake 
of "training, testing and inquiry."·*·® The dialectician gains proficiency in
3argumentation since he must argue with valid syllogisms, and must learn to 
recognize fallacies. Sometimes such discussions are undertaken not just for 
the sake of training and practice in argumentation, but for the purpose of 
testing a knowledge claim. The defender of a thesis may claim to know that 
the thesis is true, and dialectic provides one with the ability to test such 
claims. (Aristotle thus speaks of peirastike, the "art of testing", as a part 
or form of dialectic.)^  Even though the aim of dialectical arguments is not 
to establish truth - indeed, as we have seen, the dialectician sometimes 
argues for false conclusions and rests his arguments on false premises - 
nevertheless, such arguments may be useful for philosophical inquiry insofar 
as they indicate the extent to which different views can be supported by 
reputable opinions. An initially paradoxical thesis might seem more plausible 
if one can show that it is implied by certain views that are commonly held. 
(Some of Socrates' arguments seem to fit this description.) Dialectic may 
also help üs in philosophy by enabling us to argue both for and against a 
given thesis: Aristotle suggests that when we are engaged in a philosophical 
inquiry (not a dialectical discussion), the ability to argue both sides will 
help us to see more readily where the truth lies.18 This ability to see both 
strengths and weaknesses in a position is especially useful when one is 
inquiring into the first principles of a particular science or discipline, for 
since the principles are primitive in relation to the other truths of the 
science, the relevant reputable opinions are all one has to go on.19
While practice in dialectic is useful for philosophy in several dif­
ferent ways, Aristotle clearly treats dialectical discussion and philosophi­
cal inquiry as distinct, nonoverlapping activities: insofar as one is engaged 
in dialectical discussion one is not engaged in philosophical inquiry, and 
vice versa.20 m  the Topics the terms "dialectic" and "dialectical" are used 
exclusively for the kind of rule-governed discussion I have described. 
Aristotle does not speak of a "dialectical method" of doing philosophy; he 
does not distinguish a type of dialectic that might be used in a philosophical 
investigation, nor does he speak of a "philosophical use of dialectic." All 
of these notions, as far as I can see, are simply not to be found in the 
Topics,.
Ill
I now want to turn to the familiar passage at the beginning of 
Aristotle's discussion of acrasia in Bk. VII of the NE in which he outlines 
the method of inquiry he will use in the subsequent investigation. This 
method has been carefully scrutinized in a number of recent discussions,21 and 
I will not offer a detailed examination. For my purposes, it will be enough, 
as in the case of dialectic in the Topics, to sketch the main features of the 
method.
4Aristotle gives the fullest description of the method in NE VII 1, 22 
but there are a few other passages in the ethical treatises that supply useful 
information, most notably in the discussions of happiness and friendship in 
Books I and VII of the EE respectively.23 Although endoxa or "reputable 
opinions" seem to be a prominent feature of the method, Aristotle does not use 
the terms "dialectic" or "dialectical" in any of these passages. As we shall 
see, it is not at all clear that Aristotle would approve of characterizing the 
method as "dialectical" or labelling it as "the method of dialectic." It 
therefore seems prudent to follow Jonathan Barnes's lead, and to refer to it 
as the "method of endoxa.■
The method instructs us to begin by gathering and setting out the various 
phainomena pertaining to the subject of inquiry, in the case of a science 
like astronomy the phainomena would be the observations of the movements of 
the heavenly bodies,but in the case of acrasia the phainomena are the 
endoxa or the reputable opinions about it. in the next stage we bring out and 
discuss the conflicts among the endoxa and the various aporiai or difficulties 
that we encounter in thinking about the subject, in the final stage we 
attempt to solve the aporiai and, if possible, to show the truth "of all the 
endoxa...or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative."
The endoxa we begin with are often not clearly formulated, and one of the 
ways of solving the aporiai is to clarify the endoxa by making distinctions 
and substituting terminology which is more precise.conflicts among the 
endoxa may disappear once these are clarified and given more precise formula­
tions. Using the same techniques we show in what ways the reputable opinions 
are true and in what ways they are not true. It is not always possible to 
■save* the endoxa in this way; sometimes we may simply have to reject some of 
the endoxa. Given that endoxa can be ranked in terms of their reputability, 
if we have to sacrifice some we should always sacrifice those which are rela­
tively less reputable and preserve those which are most reputable or most 
"authoritative." Through the process of clarifying, sifting and pruning, we 
should try to maximize the degree of reputability within the set of accepted 
endoxa while preserving overall consistency.
One naturally wonders why Aristotle thinks that a satisfactory account of 
acrasia will justify, if not all, then most of the endoxa about it. There is 
an important assumption underlying the method which is made explicit in a few 
places. Consider the following methodological remarks at the beginning of ee 
1 6 :
About all these matters we must seek conviction through 
arguments, using the phainomena as evidence and paradigms 
(marturiois kai paradeigmasi). It would be best that all 
men should agree with what we are going to say, but if not, 
then that all should in some way agree; and this they will 
do if they can be brought to shift their ground (hoper
5metabibazomenoi poiesousin). For each individual has 
something to contribute to the truth, and with this as a 
starting-point we must give some sort of proof about these 
matters. For by advancing from sayings which are true but 
not clear he will arrive at sayings that are [both true 
and] clear, always exchanging the more familiar and 
confused statements for those which are more knowable.26
All endoxa apparently contain some truth;27 the endoxa need to be re­
fined, more precisely expressed, so that their truth will be clear. This 
assumption is weakened somewhat in the NE VII in that Aristotle there implies 
that some of the endoxa may have to be rejected.28 But still the goal is 
something approaching a consensus omnium. So an important assumption 
underlying the method of endoxa is that all or most endoxa about a given 
subject are at least partially true; this assumption explains the requirement 
that our account not only accord with but justify all or most of the endoxa.29
IV
If we now compare the accounts I have given of dialectic in the Topics 
and the method of endoxa in the NE, we immediately notice a number of super­
ficial contrasts but also, I think, some deeper and more substantial dif­
ferences. The method of endoxa does not involve a rule-governed discussion 
between two individuals who take on the roles of questioner and answerer. The 
kind of inquiry envisioned by the method could be carried out by a group of 
several people, but it could just as easily be conducted by one person work­
ing alone. Further, while the business of setting out and solving aporiai is 
a prominent feature of the method of endoxa, it does not seem to play any 
essential role in the dialectical discussions described in the Topics.
We notice deeper dissimilarities between the two activities when we 
reflect on the kinds of arguments used and the role of endoxa. As we have 
seen, it is sometimes advisable for a dialectician to base his arguments on 
false premises and to argue for false conclusions. Arguments of this sort 
would seem to be completely out of place in the method of endoxa; if the aim 
is to show the truth contained in the endoxa, it is difficult to see how 
arguments from false premises or to false conclusions would ever be appro­
priate. Further, the role played by endoxa in the two activities seems quite 
different. The dialectician does not try to justify all or most of the endoxa 
about a given subject. His aim in a dialectical discussion is limited to 
defending or refuting a specific thesis. He must build his arguments on the 
strongest premises he can muster, i.e. on premises that are as endoxon as 
possible. The practitioner of the method of endoxa, on the other hand, is not 
bound by this requirement; Aristotle does not stipulate that when we attempt 
to reconcile and justify the endoxa we must argue from premises that are them­
selves endoxa.30 m  fact, his own arguments in the discussion of acrasia (and 
in the discussion of friendship in EE VII) rest on premises which are pretty 
clearly not endoxa.21 The roles played by endoxa in the two activities seem in
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a way to be reversed. Though the conclusion the dialectician argues for need A 
not be endoxon, the supporting premises must be as endoxon as possible. The 
practitioner of the method of endoxa, on the other hand, need not base his 
arguments on endoxa, but the views he supports or justifies must be as endoxon 
as possible.
in view of these substantial differences between the method of endoxa and 
dialectic as described in the Topics, it seems quite mistaken to say that the 
description of the method in NE VII 1 gives "a compact summary of the proce­
dure" involved in dialectical discussions, or that "the account of the dialec­
tical method in the Topics and its practice in the Ethics is close."32 if we 
want to continue to describe the method of endoxa as Aristotle's dialectical 
method, then we should at least be clear about the fact that this method does 
not correspond to the description of dialectic in the Topics.
The prominence of endoxa in the method of endoxa has naturally led people 
to look for connections between the method and what Aristotle says about 
dialectic in the Topics. However, I think it is more illuminating to compare 
the method with Aristotle's conception of what is involved in a scientific 
inquiry, as Owen has suggested,Aristotle seems to have used the term 
phainomena as a variant for endoxa because he saw a parallel between the role 
of endoxa in a philosophical inquiry and that of perceptual phainomena in 
scientific investigations, in the investigation of some natural phenomenon 
like earthquakes or eclipses we have to begin with an extensive familiarity 
with the phainomena - the various observations that we and others have made in 
regard to these events. Aristotle typically criticizes theories of his pre­
decessors for failure to account for some of the relevant phainomena, or for 
proposing hypotheses that directly conflict with some of the phainomena. in a 
well known passage in the pe cáelo he says that the ultimate test of a scien­
tific theory is how well it accounts for the perceptible phainomena.34
in a similar way, in the investigation of acrasia we must begin with a 
good grasp of the relevant phainomena. Here, however, the phainomena consist 
chiefly if not exclusively of the endoxa or reputable opinions about acrasia.35 
The test of an explanation of acrasia, as of a scientific explanation, is how 
well it accounts for the phainomena; an adequate explanation must account for 
all or most of the relevant phainomena.36 m  both the scientific and the 
philosophical cases, the proposed explanations or theories are presumably 
suggested by the phainomena, but they are not based on the phainomena in the 
sense that they could be inferred from them. In other words, the arguments 
and explanations we give in accounting for the endoxa about acrasia are not 
based on those endoxa. consider, for example, Aristotle's appeal to two sorts 
of premises in a practical syllogism as a way of distinguishing different 
senses in which a man might act against his knowledge of what he ought to do.37 
This is a bit of technical apparatus that comes, not from endoxa, but from 
Aristotle's own philosophical workshop.
It is sometimes thought that according to the "dialectical method", or 
the method of endoxa, the arguments we use to account for the endoxa should
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themselves be based on endoxa.38 Nothing like this is said in Aristotle's 
description of the method in NE VII; moreover, the view seems quite implausi­
ble if one looks at the actual arguments and explanations put forward by 
Aristotle in his discussion of acrasia. I believe the source of this view is 
the belief that there is a close connection between the method of endoxa and 
dialectic as described in the Topics; since the premises of dialecical argu­
ment must be endoxa, one infers that the same is true of arguments or expla­
nations in the method of endoxa. I hope what I have said about the dissimi­
larities between dialectic and the method of endoxa, and about the close 
parallel between this method and Aristotle's conception of scientific expla­
nation, will make us question the view that arguments conducted in accordance 
with the method must be based on endoxa.
V
If what I have argued thusfar is correct, we should not look to the 
Topics for illumination in regard to Aristotle's method in ethics. But what 
about the so-called method of endoxa? it is often claimed that this is the 
method Aristotle follows, not only in his discussion of acrasia, but through­
out the ethical works, in particular, the discussion of happiness in NE I is 
thought to be "dialectical," and to be a clear example of the kind of inquiry 
described in VII 1. We begin with a setting out of the endoxa about happi­
ness, views held by the many and the wise. Aristotle then argues for his own 
account, i.e. in his argument appealing to the human ergon. Finally, he 
returns to the endoxa, and tries to show that his definition can account for 
all or most of them.39 There is no explicit reference to aporiae in the 
discussion, but bringing to light the conflicts between the different views 
about the nature of happiness would presumably exemplify this part of the 
method of endoxa.
There has been some dispute about whether the premises of the ergon argu­
ment, which leads to Aristotle's account of happiness, are regarded as endoxa. 
Those who have claimed that the premises are not endoxa have inferred that 
this part of the discussion at least is not dialectical.^Of now it is true 
that if the premises of the ergon argument are not endoxa, the argument would 
not fit the description of dialectical arguments given in the Topics. But, as 
I noted earlier, it does not seem to be a requirement of the method of endoxa 
that the account given be based on endoxa. There is no mention of such a re­
quirement in the description of the method, and it is pretty clear that parts 
at least of Aristotle's account of acrasia are not based on endoxa. So even 
if the premises of the ergon argument are not endoxa, this would not prevent 
the discussion of happiness from being a clear application of the method of 
endoxa.
Although the stages of the discussion of happiness correspond pretty 
closely to the stages of the method of endoxa, there are some fairly important 
discrepancies, as we shall see. In view of these discrepancies, I think it 
would be misleading to say that Aristotle is following the method in his 
examination of happiness.
8A key requirement of the method is that one give an account of, or show 
the truth of, all or most of the endoxa about the subject under investigation. 
But Aristotle apparently does not think that he needs to do this in the case 
of happiness. At the beginning of I 8, after he has presented his definition 
of happiness, he tells us that we should consider it not only in the light of 
the foregoing argument but also in the light of the legomena, the things said 
about happiness.41 He then tries to show that his account is in accord with 
the various legomena or endoxa concerning happiness.
Aristotle is not concerned, however, to preserve and vindicate all or 
most of the relevant endoxa. His choice of views against which he will test 
his account is quite selective. There is no mention of the commonly held 
views that the good is pleasure or honor or wealth. These views are included 
in the initial survey of endoxa in chapters 4 and 5, and are rather brusquely 
dismissed as inadequate.^ Aristotle apparently believes that since these 
endoxa are not even partially true there is no need for him to show that his 
account of happiness is in accord with them.
It is also noteworthy that nowhere in Book I does Aristotle suggest that 
there is an element of truth in all of the endoxa, or that we must advance 
from views that are true but unclear to views that are both true and clear. 
There is a passage in chapter 8 that is sometimes taken as an endorsement of 
this optimistic evaluation of endoxa. After Aristotle has gone through a list 
of the views against which he will test his theory, he mentions that some of 
these views have been held by many people and men of old, others by a few 
distinguished individuals. He then says:
It is unlikely that either of these [groups] should be 
entirely mistaken; it is more likely that they are right 
about some one thing or even about most. (1098b 28-29)
Hardie interprets this passage as saying that the various endoxa about 
happiness are "likely to be right in at least some one respect or even in most 
respects."43 But we should note, first of all, that Aristotle is not talking 
about all of the endoxa but only a select group, secondly, he does not say 
that each view held by the two groups of individuals will be right in one or 
even most respects, but that these groups will be right in one or even most of 
the views that they hold.
It is understandable that Aristotle would have a more reserved attitude 
towards the endoxa about happiness, given his view that one's conception of 
the good is strongly influenced by one's character.44 He believes that most 
men are radically mistaken about happiness, equating it with an apolaustic 
life, a life he characterizes as "suitable to beasts."45 once bad habits are 
ingrained in one's character, there is little hope that arguments will have 
any effect on that person's values. Only the fortunate minority who have had 
a good upbringing will be able to derive genuine profit from lectures on 
ethics.4”
What I am suggesting, then, is that Aristotle does not try to vindicate 
all or most of the endoxa about happiness because he believes that one's
9values are a reflection of one's character and that most people are likely to 
be deeply mistaken in their conception of the good life. The views which he 
argues are in harmony with his account of happiness are pretty clearly the 
views of people who have had the "right" sort of upbringing.
Por some identify happiness with virtue, some with practi­
cal wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, 
others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure 
or not without pleasure; while others include also external 
prosperity. (1098b 23-26)
There is therefore an important difference between the method Aristotle 
follows in his discussion of happiness and the method of endoxa outlined in 
Book VII.
VI
If we compare the discussions of happiness in the EE and the NE, and in 
particular the remarks about method, we see much closer connections between 
the Eudemian discussion and the method of endoxa. For instance, the term 
phainomena is used several times as a variant for endoxa, in the same way as 
in NE VII; in the Nicomachean discussion this term is never used - instead we 
find either doxai (1095a 29) or legomena (1098b 10). This is probably not an 
accident for the term phainomena used in this way occurs fairly frequently in 
the EE but it does not seem to be used in this way in the NE except in the 
passage on the method of endoxa. In the discussion of friendship in EE VII, 
for example, there are some prefatory remarks of a methodological nature in 
which ta phainomena is used interchangeably with t£ dokounta, and the term 
crops up again and again in later chapters of the book. By contrast, the term 
phainomena does not occur at all in the Nicomachean discussion of friendship.47
Earlier we cited a passage in EE I in which it is said that all of the 
endoxa about happiness are true in some way or in some respect, and that what 
is needed is to clarify these views so that we eventually arrive at statements 
that are both true and clear. The aim of the inquiry is thus the same as that 
of the method of endoxa: to preserve and vindicate most if not all of the 
reputable opinions. This difference between the Eudemian and Nicomachean 
discussions of happiness is related to the terminological difference I 
mentioned - the fact that phainomena is used in the EE but not in the NE· in 
the case of a scientific investigation, the phainomena we begin with often 
seem puzzing and appear to conflict with each other. We assume that a correct 
explanation will solve the puzzles and show that all the phainomena are "well 
founded" and do not conflict with each other. It may sometimes be necessary 
to question some of the phainomena, but an explanation that committed us to 
rejecting a significant portion of the phainomena would not be acceptable. As 
noted earlier, the method of endoxa involves the same view of the relationship 
between explanation and endoxa: a satisfactory explanation must account for 
all or most of the endoxa. Because of this parallel, I suggested that
10 Λ
Aristotle thought it appropriate to use the term phainomena as a variant for 
endoxa in his description of the method; it is a way of bringing out the 
similarity he sees between, e.g., an account of the motions of the planets and 
an account of acrasia.
We have seen that in the EE he believes that an account of the same sort 
- one that vindicates most if not all of the endoxa - can be given in the case 
of happiness, while in the NE he does not hold this view, in the NE it is 
enough if his account of happiness accords with a select group of endoxa - the 
beliefs of those who are likely to have sound views about the nature of the 
good life. Moreover, the relationship between these endoxa and his account of 
happiness seems to be understood in a different way. instead of the account 
vindicating, or showing the truth of, the endoxa, he speaks of the endoxa 
"agreeing with", or "being in harmony with" (sunadei) his account. Because of 
these differences, there is no longer a close parallel between the endoxa 
about happiness and the phainomena in a scientific inquiry; and I would 
suggest that this is why Aristotle does not use the term phainomena in his 
discussion of happiness in the NE.
We might plausibly suppose that Aristotle, at the time of writing the EE 
and the common Bk. VII, saw close parallels between the methods involved in 
ethical and scientific inquiries, and that he used similar terminology to draw 
attention to these parallels. Later, when he wrote the NE, he came to believe 
that there were important differences between the two methods, and he changed 
his terminology accordingly. This seems a plausible hypothesis; but there may 
be other equally plausible ways of explaining the methodological differences 
between the two treatises. The important point is that these differences 
exist, and that the method Aristotle follows in the Nicomachean discussion of 
happiness is not the method of endoxa.
VIII
What i have tried to do so far is not to give an account of Aristotle's 
method in ethics but to clarify the phainomena that need to be considered in 
giving such an account. I first argued that it is a mistake to view the 
method of endoxa of Bk. VII of the Ethics as essentially the same as the 
method of dialectical discussion described in the Topics. I then tried to 
show that, although Aristotle seems to follow the method of endoxa in his 
treatment of happiness in the EE, he uses somewhat different procedures in the 
parallel discussion in the NE. In my concluding remarks I would like to 
discuss, in a general and tentative way, the question I mentioned at the 
beginning: what sort of rational justification of ethical first principles can 
be given, according to Aristotle? I
I mentioned three different answers that have been given by commenta­
tors. some claim that, according to Aristotle, we come to acquire a grasp of 
ethical principles through habituation, and they are not susceptible to any
11
► form of rational justification, others argue that, although moral first 
principles cannot be scientifically demonstrated, they can be justified 
through dialectical arguments, i.e. arguments based on endoxa. A third view 
contends that Aristotle bases his moral theory, not on endoxa, but on certain 
principles about human nature drawn from his psychology and metaphysics.
The thought behind the first view might be sketched along the following 
lines. Aristotle holds that we cannot deliberate about ends, and in particu­
lar about the ultimate end which is the first principle of ethics; we must 
simply assume this end as the starting point of our deliberations. It might 
be thought that, even though we cannot deliberate about the ultimate end, 
there is surely some other form of reasoning which could be used to justify 
one conception of the end over another. However, Aristotle says at one point 
that the first principle of ethics is not supported by reasoning or argument, 
but it is virtue, either natural or produced by habituation, that is 
responsible for our grasp of the end.I *4®
What this passage says more exactly is that there is no logos 
didaskalikos of first principles, either in the theoretical or in the practi­
cal sphere. This is surprising in that, in the case of the sciences, although 
Aristotle holds that it is not possible to demonstrate first principles - i.e. 
to give an apodeixis of them - in the well known passage at the beginning of 
the Topics he suggests that such principles can be reached through dialectical 
arguments. Perhaps we can alleviate the difficulty by noting that the expres­
sion logos didaskalikos has a special technical meaning in the Topics, and is 
contrasted with the expression logos dialektjkos.4® A logos didaskalikos is 
in effect a scientific demonstration, while a logos dialektikos is an argument 
based on endoxa. If logos didaskalikos is understood in this technical sense 
in the passage in the Ethics, then Aristotle will be making the not surprising 
claim that our grasp of ethical first principles is not based on scientific 
demonstration. This would leave open the possibility that, even though a 
person's good character is chiefly responsible for his or her grasp of the 
end, one might be able to justify that end by a kind of argument different 
from scientific demonstration.
This is surely what Aristotle intended to say, for he does offer an 
argument for his account of the ultimate end, viz. the argument appealing to 
the human ergon, so the question becomes: How should we characterize 
Aristotle's argument for his first principle, given that it cannot be a 
scientific demonstration (or logos didaskalikos)? It is sometimes thought 
that if an argument is not demonstrative, it must be dialectical; and there­
fore the argument for the definition of happiness must be dialectical.
I think it would be generally agreed that at least part of Aristotle's
argument for his first principle is dialectical. The critical survey of
opinions about the nature of happiness in chapter 5 can be seen as part of the
overall argument insofar as it eliminates several competing conceptions of the 
good. It is generally agreed that the specific arguments employed in this 
critique are based on endoxa, and thus fit the description of dialectical 
arguments.
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However, whether the argument appealing to the human ergon is dialectical 
is not so clear, and there is much disagreement among the commentators.
Cooper believes that the premises are clearly introduced as endoxa, but Hardie 
and others have argued that they are derived from Aristotle’s scientific works 
and therefore not endoxa.5β Irwin has recently argued that, although the 
premises of the ergon argument are derived from the De Anima and Metaphysics, 
they are based on endoxa - non-ethical endoxa -, and so the argument can still 
be viewed as dialectical.51
Irwin believes that Aristotle needs to go, and does go, outside of ethics 
in order to find adequate support for his ethical first principle. However, 
there does not seem to be any indication in the text that principles from 
other disciplines are being appealed to. And further, we should bear in mind 
that Aristotle refers to the definition of happiness as a first principle, and 
says that because it is a first principle we must not ask for the 'why', the 
dihoti; showing the 'that', the hoti, is sufficient.52 m  other words, since 
the account of happiness is a first principle, it is not possible to derive it 
from more fundamental principles, so the ergon argument is not an argument 
that shows the dihoti - that gives the ground or explanation of the truth of 
the conclusion. The premises of the argument cannot be prior to, and more 
knowable than, the conclusion.
In I 13 of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle distinguishes between 
syllogisms of the hoti and those of the dihoti, i.e. between those that show 
that the conclusion is true and those that show not only that it is true but 
why it is t r u e . T h i s  is clearly the distinction referred to in the passage 
following the ergon argument, we have a syllogism of the hoti when the middle 
term is not the cause (the aitia) of the conclusion's being true, but it is 
more familiar and better known ¿o us; the conclusion, on the other hand, is 
better known or more knowable in itself.54 Applying this to the ergon argu­
ment, Aristotle's point would be that the premises are more familiar and 
better known to us, but the conclusion is more knowable in itself. The argu­
ment would only provide a justification of the first principle in the weak 
sense that it would provide plausible grounds for someone who did not yet have 
an adequate grasp of the principle. Once one has a grasp of the definition as 
a first principle, one sees that it is not possible to justify it by deriving 
it from more fundamental truths. This seems to be the lesson we are to draw 
from Aristotle's comments on the ergon argument.
In the light of these results, the question whether the premises of the 
argument are endoxa does not seem so important. However, the fact that the 
hoti - dihoti distinction is used in connection with the argument may be an 
indication that Aristotle did not regard the premises as having the status of 
endoxa. For although a syllogism of the hoti is not an apodeixis or demon­
stration in the strict sense, it is nevertheless a kind of a p o d e i x i s . The 
premises are, by assumption, known to be true, and the conclusion is validly 
inferred. Dialectical arguments, in which the premises are laid down not as 
truths but as endoxa, are always contrasted with apodeictic arguments.
These questions obviously need further inquiry. As I said at the outset.
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my chief objective in this paper is the prior task of setting out and clarify­
ing the data that we need to consider in giving an account of Aristotle's 
method in ethics. I have tried to show that these data or phainomena are more 
complex than is usually supposed, in particular, I have argued that it may be 
quite misleading to speak of the method of endoxa as the dialectical method, 
and that it is a mistake to think there are close parallels between this 
method and the concept of dialectic discussed in the Topics, it is often 
claimed that Aristotle follows the method of endoxa in his discussion of 
happiness in NE I; I suggested that although the procedures used by Aristotle 
in the EE seem to accord with the method, the procedures of the Nicomachean 
discussion are different in important ways, with a clearer grasp of the 
complexity of the phainomena, we should be in a better position to understand 
exactly what Aristotle's method in ethics is.
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